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PROGRAM INTEGRITY AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CORPORATE 
IDENTITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
INTRODUCTION 
In July 2011, the Department of Education promulgated new 
regulations as an effort to improve the performance of for-profit universities 
that receive Title IV federal student aid.1 These regulations responded to 
data illustrating students at for-profit universities borrowed and defaulted 
on student loans at disproportionate rates, faced a lack of employment 
opportunity, and were being induced into enrollment by misrepresentations 
of employment prospects and income earnings potential.2 Poor student 
outcomes in an industry heavily reliant on Title IV student aid brought 
considerable debate on how to improve the industry’s performance.3 The 
regulations (entitled Program Integrity) intended to create new 
measurement standards to evaluate Title IV receiving for-profit 
institutions.4 These standards created a post-graduation focus on programs’ 
potential to lead to “gainful employment in a recognized occupation” to 
evaluate institutional performance.5 The Department of Education (DOE or 
the Department) believed its final regulations “reflect the Department’s 
policy determination that students are not adequately protected by [the 
DOE’s] current regulatory framework.”6  However, soon before they were 
to take effect, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
vacated the regulations because the Department “failed to provide a 
reasoned explanation” for the approach taken.7 
At the heart of Program Integrity was the concern that students at for-
profit universities graduate with “unaffordable debts and poor employment 
prospects”8 with corresponding problems of “wide-spread evidence of 
waste, fraud and abuse.”9 The Department noted that “for-profit programs 
are most likely to leave their students with unaffordable debts and poor 
employment prospects.”10 Although outstanding student loan debt as a 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment—Debt Measures, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,386 (June 13, 
2011) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 668). 
 2. Id.  
 3. See infra Part III.A. 
 4. See Program Integrity: Gainful Employment—Debt Measures, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,386. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id.  
       7. Assoc. of Private Colls. and Univs. v. Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133, 158 (D.D.C. 2012).  
 8. Press Release, Dep’t of Educ., Obama Administration Announces New Steps to Protect 
Students from Ineffective Career College Programs: Gives Programs Every Chance to Improve 
While Holding Them Accountable (June 2, 2011), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-
releases/gainful-employment-regulations. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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whole is nearing $1 trillion in the United States,11 this note focuses on for-
profit institutions due to the industry’s rapidly growing enrollments and 
thus its growing importance in higher education, the industry’s reliance on 
Title IV student aid, the potential vulnerability of students in for-profit 
education, and the disproportionate percentage of student loan defaults by 
for-profit university students.12 
While Program Integrity sought accountability for the industry’s 
representations and performance, the Department’s rules would have been 
insufficient to reduce student need to borrow great amounts for tuition, and 
were unlikely to ebb the burgeoning wave of student loan default. The fatal 
shortcoming of Program Integrity was its reliance on an antiquated 
assumption that for-profit institutions operate as traditional collegiate 
bodies, while ignoring the interworking of the industry’s corporate identity 
to its collegiate operations. As a result, Program Integrity’s impact would 
ultimately have been limited as it failed to recognize the underlying motives 
of for-profit education as a corporate enterprise. Thus, improving 
performance at these institutions and the opportunities for their students 
must take an approach that appropriately considers the industry’s corporate 
identity. 
The social costs of an increased rate of student loan defaults not only 
leaves individuals with unmanageable debt obligations, but also shifts the 
burden of default onto taxpayers,13 while public for-profit universities yield 
massive returns through these loans that are guaranteed by the federal 
government.14 The extreme proliferation of for-profit universities coupled 
with their reliance on federal student aid mimics an operation reminiscent 
of those that exacerbated the subprime mortgage crisis.15 Although Program 
Integrity was vacated, this note evaluates its regulations to demonstrate how 
the Department’s approach, or any similar approach contemplated by the 
Department in the wake of Program Integrity’s abrogation, would not 
combat rising student debt and the risks rising debts pose to taxpayer 
dollars. As will be discussed, the current for-profit education industry is an 
entirely different animal than when it became Title IV eligible. If these 
                                                                                                                 
 11. FED. RESERVE BANK OF NY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT 1 
(Feb. 2013), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/national_economy/householdcredit 
/DistrictReport_Q42012.pdf. 
 12. See infra Parts II–III. 
 13. See Cheryl L. Auster, Promising a Better Future but Delivering Debt: Understanding the 
Financial and Social Impact of For-Profit College and the Effect of the New Program Integrity 
Rules, 13 SCHOLAR  631, 668 (2011). 
 14. See infra Part I.A. See also Nicholas R. Johnson, Phoenix Rising: Default Rates at 
Proprietary Institutions of Higher Education and What Can Be Done to Reduce Them, 40 J.L. & 
EDUC. 225, 230–33 (2011). 
 15. See Subprime Goes to College: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and 
Pensions, 111th Cong. 3 (2010) [hereinafter Eisman] (testimony of Steven Eisman, Portfolio 
Manager, FrontPoint Financial Services Fund). 
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universities wish to utilize the corporate identity, then obligations and 
liabilities of such enterprises should not be shielded with values attributed 
to traditional higher education. Part I of this note will describe the historical 
emergence of for-profit universities in the United States. Part II will 
describe the current context and practices of for-profit institutions. Part III 
will then describe the current legislative and regulatory context of the for-
profit education industry and elucidate the impetus behind increases in 
borrowing and default by students at for-profit universities. Part IV will 
evaluate the approach contemplated by the Department with Program 
Integrity and the potential impact it could have had on the rise of student 
default, reduction of student loan debt, and improvement of institutional 
performance.16 Finally, Part V will distinguish between the for-profit 
enterprises of today and the enterprises contemplated when the industry was 
granted Title IV eligibility, while also offering an alternative regulatory 
focus for consideration: the for-profit education sector of higher education 
would be at its most efficient if increased profits were tied to improved 
institutional performance. While for-profit education offers attractive 
benefits through specific and market-responsive education, the current 
regulatory framework fails to consider its inherent profit motive, which in 
turn encourages these institutions to offer a substandard product.  Failing to 
tie profit to performance allows the industry to post enormous profits from 
large amounts of leveraged student debt guaranteed by taxpayer dollars, 
without providing any reason to improve educational value. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PRACTICES OF FOR-PROFIT 
UNIVERSITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. EMERGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
In 2009, about 1,200 degree-granting for-profit universities operated in 
the United States.17 The genesis of for-profit education in the United States 
dates to the colonial period, when access to higher education was limited.18 
Pedagogical endeavors in colonial America focused on teaching technical 
skills, mathematics, reading, and writing.19 Opportunistic educators 
responded to student and employer demand for greater technical training by 
creating occupational programs in navigation, surveying, and 
                                                                                                                 
  16. Before Program Integrity was set to take effect, the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia vacated two of the operative regulations, nullifying the entire rulemaking.  
See Assoc. of Private Colls. and Univs. v. Duncan, 870 F.Supp.2d 133, 158 (2012).   
 17. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT’ OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION 
STATISTICS 2010, 404 at tbl. 275 (2010) [hereinafter DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2010]. 
 18. RICHARD S. RUCH, HIGHER ED, INC.: THE RISE OF THE FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITY 52 
(2001). 
 19. Id.  
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bookkeeping.20 Entrepreneurs increased the efficiency of technical training 
by merging apprenticeships into schools with a curriculum that allowed a 
master to teach several students at once.21 Proprietary schools at this time 
did not offer degrees, but instead taught skills in areas that led to 
professional employment.22 The industrial revolution and its development 
of new technologies should have encouraged for-profit education, but 
demand by populist movements for a public system of vocational education 
led to the demise of the for-profit education industry.23 
B. HIGHER EDUCATION ACT AND EXPANDED OPPORTUNITY 
For-profit education reemerged in the United States with the Higher 
Education Assistance Act (HEA) of 1965.24 As part of his sweeping “Great 
Society” domestic agenda, President Lyndon Johnson introduced the HEA 
to broaden access to postsecondary education.25 At this time, higher 
education costs dissuaded students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds 
from pursuing higher education.26 The HEA authorized “Title IV” federal 
assistance to eligible students and institutions.27 The HEA would become 
the most important program for student aid in the history of the United 
States.28 Amendments to the HEA in 1972 expanded Title IV eligibility to 
allow students to borrow student loans for the purposes of attending a for-
profit college or university.29 This expansion of eligibility “sought to 
broaden higher-education access” to prospective students without the 
financial means or desire to attend a four-year program.30 The availability 
of Title IV caused the metamorphosis of the smaller vocational programs 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 53.  
 22. See EARNINGS FROM LEARNING: THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES (David W. 
Breneman, Brian Pusser & Sarah E. Turner eds., 2006); David W. Breneman, Brian Pusser & 
Sarah E. Turner, The Contemporary Provision of For-Profit Higher Education: Mapping the 
Competitive Market, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING: THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES, id. 
at 3, 5 (David W. Breneman, Brian Pusser & Sarah E. Turner eds., 2006). 
 23. Breneman, Pusser & Turner, supra note 22, at 3, 5.  
 24. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended at 
20 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1099c-2 (2006)). 
 25. David W. Breneman & David A. Wolcott, A Crowded Lobby: Nonprofit and For-Profit 
Universities and the Emerging Politics of Higher Education, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING: THE 
RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES, supra note 22, at 170.  
 26. Jonathan D. Glater, The Other Big Test: Why Congress Should Allow College Students to 
Borrow More Through Federal Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 20 (2011). 
 27. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070–1099 (2006). At the time, Pell Grants were known as “Basic 
Educational Opportunity Grants.”  
 28. Breneman & Wolcott, supra note 25, at 170. 
 29. See Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000)); see also Breneman, Pusser & Turner, supra note 22, at 6; 
Johnson, supra note 14, at 229. 
 30. Aaron N. Taylor, “Your Results May Vary”: Protecting Students and Taxpayers Through 
Tighter Regulation of Proprietary School Representations, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 729, 753 (2010). 
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that defined for-profit education into a different animalthe sophisticated 
corporate enterprise.31 Unsavory and opportunistic entrepreneurs exploited 
the availability of federal assistance by opening “sham schools” and 
“diploma mills,” with Title IV funds funneled as profit into owners’ pockets 
with little to no regulatory oversight.32 This lack of oversight permitted such 
“sham schools” to use deceptive and fraudulent marketing practices to 
increase enrollments, thereby increasing profits.33 Eventually, increased 
enforcement led to over 800 schools between 1992 and 1997 losing federal 
assistance eligibility because of such marketing practices.34 For these 
schools, losing federal aid eligibility operated as an executioner throwing 
the lever to the gallows. As will be seen, for-profit institutions today also 
exist by way of their Title IV eligibility, where a loss of Title IV eligibility 
would be an institutional death sentence.35 
II. CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF FOR-PROFIT 
UNIVERSITIES 
For-profit universities are perceived to focus on post-graduate 
“employability,” yet demonstrate little concern for “educational value.”36 
The industry’s perspective is that this sentiment understates the totality of 
the educational value offered by for-profit learning.37 Nevertheless, the 
industry embraces an employability-focused approach as pragmatic and 
responsive, as it reflects public expectation that higher education should 
result in employability.38 
A. STUDENT POPULATION 
For-profit education prides itself on opening access to higher education 
for groups typically underrepresented and unaccustomed to traditional 
higher education institutions.39 Such students look for a “no frills” approach 
to education to provide them with specific training in minimal time.40 Such 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Sarah E. Turner, For-Profit Colleges in the Context of the Market for Higher Education, in 
EARNINGS FROM LEARNING: THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES, supra note 22, at 51.  
 32. Taylor, supra note 30, at 753.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Patrick F. Linehan, Dreams Protected: A New Approach to Policing Proprietary Schools’ 
Misrepresentations, 89 GEO. L.J. 753, 760 (2001). 
 35. See infra Part III.A. 
 36. See Ruch, supra note 18, at 7.  
 37. See, e.g., id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. STAFF OF S. HEALTH, EDUCATION LABOR AND PENSIONS COMM., 111TH CONG., THE 
RETURN ON THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT IN FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION: DEBT WITHOUT A DIPLOMA 
3 (2010) [hereinafter DEBT WITHOUT A DIPLOMA] (Report of Sen. Harkin). 
 40. See, e.g., Breneman, Pusser & Turner, supra note 22, at 78.  
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“non-traditional” students comprise a majority of the for-profit education 
student population.41   
Demographics42 




Female43 55.1% 56.1% 69.2% 
Minority Students44 37.1% 33.4% 53.3% 
Average Age45 26 24 28 
Income <20k46 24.2% 17.8% 44.5% 
 
These figures demonstrate that more “non-traditional” students 
compose the student populations at for-profit universities.  The populations 
at for-profit schools are more likely to be female, older, from lower means, 
and more racially and ethnically diverse than their public and private non-
profit counterparts.     
B. PROGRAMS AND EDUCATION 
 
The for-profit education industry strives to provide a high quality 
education for skills that markets demand, while cutting the “fat” off of 
expenses in traditional higher education curricula.47 The industry prides 
itself on having the ability to swiftly change to provide new skills that meet 
the needs when employment demands shift to new and different 
industries.48 The industry believes this market response separates it from a 
traditional higher education structure that ignores such new opportunities.49 
                                                                                                                 
 41. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-600, STRONGER DEP’T OF EDUC. 
OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE ONLY ELIGIBLE STUDENTS RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDENT 
AID 1 (2009) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT]. Non-traditional student characteristics include women, 
minorities, students over 25, and financially independent students. Id.  
 42. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PROFILE OF 
UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS: 2007-2008 (2010), [hereinafter 2007-2008 Education Statistics], 
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010205.pdf (Both Public and For-Profit figures 
aggregate two-year and four-year program statistics). 
 43. Id. at 56 tbl.3.1.  
 44. Id. at 60 tbl.3.2 (aggregating all minority students). 
 45. Id. at 64 tbl.3.3.  
 46. Id. at 72 tbl.3.5-A. (aggregating both dependent and independent income figures).  
 47. See Ruch, supra note 18, at 17–19.  
 48. See Breneman, Pusser & Turner, supra note 22, at 5.  
 49. See Ruch, supra note 18, at 69 (“Trusting the market . . . appears to be a radical and 
foreign notion for most non-profit colleges and universities. Although they acknowledge the 
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The control that industry exercises over programs allows institutions to 
offer certifications in skills by experienced practitioners in both traditional 
and emerging fields.50 Since its early colonial days and the “mom-and-pop” 
school pre-HEA era, the for-profit education industry has evolved to be 
dominated by large multi-state institutions that offer diplomas in two-year 
and four-year programs,51 with some institutions even offering degrees at 
the graduate and doctoral level.52 
C. INDUSTRY MOTIVE 
For-profit education is “unabashedly” driven to realize profit.53 There 
are currently thirteen publicly held for-profit universities that dominate the 
industry, with many others closely held.54 Inherent in this profit motive is 
the incentive to reduce costs by eliminating inefficient and ineffective 
programs to increase margins.55 For-profit institutions minimize costs by 
utilizing new technologies and organizational practices to deliver higher 
education programs.56 Expansion into online course offerings facilitates 
flexible scheduling and convenience, while creating potential for unlimited 
class sizes free from the physical classroom needs of traditional college 
campuses.57 This convenience offers greater access to higher education for 
potential students underserved by traditional public and private nonprofit 
institutions.58 For-profit universities keep costs low and return greater 
margins by precluding expenditures associated with traditional institutions 
of higher education—e.g., student housing, auditoriums, stadiums, and 
sports teams59—and also by eliminating the need to provide faculty with 
                                                                                                                 
reality of the market and are willing to respond to it, they generally do not regard it as 
trustworthy.”).  
 50. For a general list of typical programs, see Turner, supra note 31, at 58.   
 51. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 230; OVERSIGHT, supra note 41, at 1.  
 52. OVERSIGHT, supra note 41, at 1. 
 53. Ruch, supra note 18, at 95–97.  
 54. Robin Wilson, For-Profit Colleges Change Higher Education’s Landscape, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 7, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/For-Profit-Colleges-Change/64012/; 
see also DIGEST OF EDUC. STATISTICS 2010, supra note 17, at 404 tbl.275. 
 55. Turner, supra note 31, at 58.  
 56. Breneman, Pusser & Turner, supra note 22, at 6.  
 57. Catherine Elton, Degrees of Difficulty: The Truth About Online Universities, CONSUMERS 
DIG. (Mar. 2009), http://www.consumersdigest.com/family/degrees-of-difficulty. Until 2006, 
accredited institutions were required to offer 50 percent of their courses on a physical campus to 
receive Title IV aid. Sam Dillon, Online Colleges Receive a Boost from Congress, N.Y.TIMES, 
Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/01/national/01educ.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
The Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2006 eliminated this “50 percent Rule” for courses 
attended via telecommunication, like online courses. Pub. L. 109-171 Title VII § 8002 (2006) 
(codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(3), 484(l)(1)(A) (2006)). 
 58. Taylor, supra note 31, at 782. See also supra Part I-B; Glater, supra note 26.  
 59. In a bit of irony, the University of Phoenix paid $154.5 million for the naming rights to the 
stadium of the NFL’s Arizona Cardinals for twenty years, although the University of Phoenix 
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compensation for “nonteaching activities” while optimizing class sizes to be 
the most efficient.60 
1. Increased Enrollment and Revenues 
Higher education as a whole offers prospective students various and 
diverse courses of learning and programs, but ultimately no matter the 
structure or label of the institution there is only one consumerthe student. 
With this in mind, for-profit universities must continually increase 
enrollment to realize increased profit.61 In the competitive market for 
students, for-profit institutions have managed to achieve dramatic 
enrollment increases by recruiting students through attractive benefits like 
flexible course schedules, including courses taken online, with the 
availability of federal student aid to cover tuition.62 These efforts have 
shown success: in an eight-year period, industry-wide enrollment increased 
by 474 percent through the addition of 1.7 million individuals to the student 
populations.63 The Apollo Group, the owner of the University of Phoenix, 
in one year itself increased enrollment between Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 and 
2010 by 27,800 students, an increase of 6.3 percent.64 This enrollment 
increase corresponded to increased revenue from roughly $4 billion in FY 
2009,65 to $4.925 billion in FY 201066—an increase of 23.1 percent.67 In 
October 2009, another of the largest for-profit education providers, 
Education Management Corporation (EDMC), posted a 22.7 percent 
increase in enrollment by adding 25,200 students to a total population of 
                                                                                                                 
itself has no football team.  U. of Phoenix Buys Naming Rights to Cardinal Stadium, ESPN NFL 
(Sept. 26, 2006, 4:18 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2603052.  
 60. Ruch, supra note 18, at 87–88.  
 61. Id. at 95–97.  
 62. Johnson, supra note 14, at 229–30.  
 63. Compare LAURA G. KNAPP ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS, ENROLLMENT IN POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS, FALL 2001 AND FINANCIAL 
STATISTICS FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 5 (2003) [hereinafter 2001 EDUCATION STATISTICS] (472,021 
students enrolled in Title IV eligible private, for-profit institutions), with LAURA G. KNAPP ET AL., 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, ENROLLMENT IN 
POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS, FALL 2009; GRADUATION RATES, 2003 & 2006 COHORTS; AND 
FINANCIAL STATISTICS, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 7 (2011) [hereinafter 2009 DEP’T OF EDUC. 
REPORT] (2,239,026 students enrolled in private, for-profit institutions). 
 64. Compare Apollo Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6 (Oct. 27, 2009) [hereinafter 
2009 Apollo Annual Report] (443,000 students enrolled at the end of FY 2009), with Apollo Grp., 
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6 (Oct. 21, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Apollo Annual Report] 
(470,800 students enrolled at the end of FY 2010). 
 65. 2009 Apollo Annual Report, supra note 64, at 6.  
 66. 2010 Apollo Annual Report, supra note 64, at 5. 
     67. An inference can be made from this data is that since revenue increases outpaced 
enrollment increases, either tuition costs increased from 2009 and 2010, an increased percentage 
of students left the university after paying tuition but before the student population was reported in 
the 10-K, the university became more cost efficient, or a combination thereof. 
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136,000.68 This dramatic increase in enrollment also resulted in a 
corresponding revenue increase from $2.011 billion69 to $2.508 billion,70 a 
24.7 percent increase. As a whole, the for-profit education industry 
generated $23.4 billion in revenues in FY 2009.71 One Senate committee 
report showed that the FY 2009 profits of sixteen institutions totaled $2.7 
billion, with margins ranging from 16.1 percent to 37.1 percent.72 
2. Returns on Investment 
Large returns produced from increased enrollments and profit margins 
coupled with prioritizing cost efficiency made the for-profit education 
industry a “Wall Street darling.”73 From 1995 to 2011, the stock price of the 
Apollo Group appreciated by 4,900 percent.74 In boasting its business 
model, one author put these eye-popping numbers into perspective: “[I]f 
one had purchased $10,000 worth of Apollo [Group] stock when first issued 
in 1994, by December 2004 it would have been worth roughly 
$1,034,743.”75 That same year, Apollo and ITT Technical Institute (another 
large for-profit institution) outperformed the heavyweights of the energy 
and technology industries.76 Not only do investors reap benefits, but for-
profit universities are also cash cows for parent companies. Kaplan 
University, a subsidiary of The Washington Post, saw growth of 9 percent 
in one quarter to $743.3 million in revenue,77 with annual net revenue for 
that year of $1.789 billion.78 The revenue of its Kaplan subsidiary 
represented 38 percent of revenue for its parent Washington Post Co. that 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Compare Educ. Mgmt. LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 79 (Aug. 27, 2009) [hereinafter 
2009 EDMC Annual Report] (110,800 students), with Educ. Mgmt. LLC, Annual Report (Form 
10-K) 88 (Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 EDMC Annual Report] (136,000 students). 
 69. 2009 EDMC Annual Report, supra note 68, at 5. 
 70. 2010 EDMC Annual Report, supra note 68, at 5. 
 71. See 2009 Dep’t of Educ. Report, supra note 63, at 13 tbl.5. 
 72. DEBT WITHOUT A DIPLOMA, supra note 39, at 34. 
 73. Andreas Ortmann, Capital Romance: Why Wall Street Fell in Love with Higher Education, 
in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING: THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES, supra note 22, at 145, 
149–51, 157. 
 74. On January 6, 1995, Apollo was priced at $.99, while later priced at $38.91 on October 4, 
2011. See Google Finance, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/finance?cid=657521 (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2013). 
 75. David W. Breneman, The University of Phoenix: Icon of For-Profit Higher Education, in 
EARNINGS FROM LEARNING: THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES, supra note 22, at 71, 73. 
 76. “In 2006, Apollo Group and ITT boasted returns on investment capital of 69% and 40%, 
respective, beating out companies such as Exxon Mobil and Microsoft.” Taylor, supra note 30, at 
757.  
 77. Tamar Lewin, Scrutiny Takes Toll on For-Profit College Company, N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 10, 
2010, at A1. 
 78. Wash. Post Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 1 (Jan. 2, 2011). This revenue figure does not 
take into account revenue derived through Kaplan University’s other divisions, such as its test 
preparation division. Id. 
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year.79 These large returns and revenues turned the for-profit industry into 
an attractive option for investors.80 
D. MARKETING EXPENSES AND METHODS TO INCREASE 
ENROLLMENT 
To encourage increased enrollments, for-profit institutions spend large 
amounts on marketing, an expense that amounts to a substantial portion of 
annual revenues.81 For example, EDMC spent $300 million on marketing in 
FY 2011, accounting for 22.4 percent of its revenue.82 In the same year, in 
order to “differentiate the University of Phoenix, and expand [Apollo’s] 
business,” the Apollo Group spent roughly $665 million (or 13.9 percent of 
its revenue) on marketing.83 Because increased enrollments are necessary to 
achieve growth,84 some commentators are concerned that institutions use 
forceful and deceptive methods to increase enrollment in programs that 
offer little to no meaningful employment prospects.85 Claims of attractive 
employment opportunities and increased earnings potential in particular 
fields are predominant in these marketing endeavors, but these 
representations have been found to be illusory or even fraudulent.86 In one 
report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that thirteen of 
fifteen for-profit schools used deceptive tactics and misleading statements 
in their recruitment practices.87 The GAO report found that schools 
misrepresented graduation rates, coached individuals on admissions tests, 
exaggerated earnings potential, and claimed programs could lead to jobs 
that often required training more advanced than the degree the schools’ 
programs offered.88 Of particular concern is that the qualifications of the 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id.  
 80. Johnson, supra note 14, at 230. See also Ortmann, supra note 73, at 149 (“[O]ne of the 
features that make the education industry interesting is its very predictable revenues and earnings . 
. . . That government funding is, and will be, a steady source of significant revenue was 
considered an important argument.”).  
 81. See Lewin, supra note 77 (“On average, for-profit universities spend about 30 percent of 
their revenue on advertising and marketing.”).  
 82. Educ. Mgmt. LLC., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 68, 96 (Aug. 30, 2011). 
 83. Press Release, Apollo Grp., Apollo Group, Inc. Reports Fiscal 2011 Fourth Quarter and 
Year End Results (Oct. 19, 2011), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml 
?c=79624&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1618736&highlight=. 
 84. Auster, supra note 13, at 640.  
 85. Johnson, supra note 14, at 227.  
 86. One former instructor at Kaplan College described recruiters for a criminal justice program 
that enticed potential students with future placements in federal law enforcement agencies, but 
were ultimately offered minimum wage security guard jobs that did not require the training 
Kaplan offered. Lewin, supra note 77.  
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students recruited by these representations make it more likely that they 
would be unable to independently evaluate the opportunities offered by 
higher education, and thus are more susceptible to relying on such claims of 
better employment opportunity and increased income.89 Although 
marketing expenses are sizeable, the data demonstrates that such expenses 
are easily recouped and surpassed through increased revenue growth caused 
by increased student enrollments.90 
In addition to suspicious marketing tactics, claims emerged that 
institutions circumvent the law by compensating recruiters based on 
enrollments. Enrollment-based compensation is strictly forbidden for 
institutions receiving Title IV funding.91 A proscription on recruitment-
based compensation aims to prevent institutions from incentivizing 
employees to enroll unqualified or poorly qualified students in programs 
that provide little benefit or leave students unable to repay the incurred 
debt.92 Lawsuits brought against for-profit institutions demonstrate that 
using recruitment-based compensation in contravention of Title IV’s 
proscription may be more worthwhile than not.93 Former recruiters and 
employees of for-profit universities have brought suits under the False 
Claims Act,94 alleging their salary was correlated to the number of students 
they enrolled.95 Though Title IV eligibility requires compliance with the 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Taylor, supra note 30, at 761; see also Program Integrity: Gainful Employment—Debt 
Measures, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,386, 34,388 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 668). 
 90. See supra Part I.C. 
 91. “The institution will not provide any commission, bonus, or other incentive payment based 
directly or indirectly on success in securing enrollments or financial aid to any persons or entities 
engaged in any student recruiting or admission activities or in making decisions regarding the 
award of student financial assistance . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(20) (2006). 
 92. See United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 93. See infra note 96; Eisman, supra note 15, at 4 (“[A]s long as the government continues to 
flood the for profit education industry with loan dollars [and] the risk for these loans is borne 
solely by the students and the government, the industry has every incentive to grow at all costs 
[and] compensate employees based on enrollment . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 94. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006). 
 95. For example, in 2009, the Apollo Group agreed to pay $78.5 million (including attorney’s 
fees) to settle a claim of recruitment-based compensation. Press Release, Apollo Grp., Apollo 
Group, Inc. Resolves University of Phoenix False Claims Act Case (Dec. 14, 2009), available at 
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=79624&p=irol-newsArticle_print&ID=1365655 
&highlight=. This settlement followed the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of a motion to dismiss, holding 
that plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to state a claim under the False Claims Act. U.S. ex rel. 
Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2006). Recently, the Department 
of Justice, as well as Attorneys General from eleven states and the District of Columbia, 
intervened in a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against EDMC for allegations of 
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Supp. 2d 433 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (No. 07-461), 2011 WL 3435895. Also, in 2007, California settled 
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compensation. California v. Corinthian Sch. Inc., No. BC374999, 2007 WL 2983118 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. July 31, 2007).  
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recruitment compensation ban,96 cutting off Title IV eligibility has a 
perverse consequence on students, as it effectively cuts off all access to 
higher education. As it stands, civil damages currently operate as the 
preferred stick for noncompliance with the proscription on recruitment-
based compensation.97  However, simple economics dictates that if 
programs use prohibited recruitment-based compensation programs that 
remain profitable after subtracting the costs from quick settlements in civil 
actions, then it is to the benefit of the for-profit education institutions to use 
whatever means necessary to recruit students so long as their doors remain 
open. 
III. TRENDS IN TITLE IV BORROWING 
A. INSTITUTIONAL RELIANCE ON TITLE IV 
“If we lose our Title IV eligibility, we would experience a dramatic 
decline in revenue and we would be unable to continue our business as it 
currently is conducted.”98 
For-profit universities derive nearly all their revenues from student 
tuition payments and fees.99 In 2001, public universities derived 19.5 
percent and 17.8 percent of their revenues from tuition and fees for their 
two-year and four-year programs, respectively,100 while private non-profit 
universities derived 53.1 percent and 38 percent from their two-year and 
four-year programs, respectively.101 By comparison, 87.2 percent of the 
revenues for-profit universities generated for two-year programs were 
derived from tuition and fees, with 87.5 percent of the revenues from four-
year programs coming from tuition and fees.102 Even with the large increase 
of enrollment during this period,103 these figures remained constant through 
2009.104 
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Public and private nonprofit schools derive much of their revenue from 
state and federal allocations, while tuition is the source for nearly all 
revenue at for-profit universities.105 Although these monies come from the 
same sources (governments), allocations to public and private nonprofit 
universities are received directly from the federal and state governments,106 
whereas student loans are received from the student borrower107—the 
university in this transaction is neither a creditor, nor is it on the hook to the 
debtor (apart from its pedagogical obligation). The distinction between 
loans and allocations is found in the expectations of the funds’ recipients. 
Allocations are fixed and predictable, while risk of lost taxpayer dollars is 
more uncertain in student loans since debts are expected to be repaid. Since 
loans are subject to the action, or inaction, of individual borrowers, the rate 
or repayment or nonpayment of loans may shift from changing trends in the 
default rate; increased rates of defaults as more students receive federal aid 
puts more taxpayer money at risk. Moreover, a default on student loans 
leaves an individual with a credit burden that generally cannot be 
discharged in bankruptcy,108 whereas there is no risk of default in direct 
federal and state dollars being allocated to public and nonprofit private 
universities. 
B. STUDENT RELIANCE ON FEDERAL AID 
Heavy dependence on tuition coincides with disproportionate amounts 
of Title IV borrowing by students who attend for-profit universities. 
Though less expensive on average than private nonprofit universities, 
tuition costs at for-profit institutions are markedly higher than tuition at 
public universities.109 As for-profit universities tend to be focused towards 
non-traditional students who often have minimal education qualifications,110 
a greater percentage of students must take out Title IV funding and in 
greater amounts.111 The 2009 average tuition for a for-profit institution was 
$26,976, compared to $16,271 and $31,401 for public and private nonprofit 
universities, respectively.112 In 2001, 83.4 percent of students attending for-
profit universities borrowed student loans, with an average of $5,518 
borrowed.113 By comparison, students at public non-profit universities 
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522 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 7 
borrowed an average of $3,050 with only 46.9 percent borrowing.114 In 
2009, 81.3 percent of students at for-profit university in a four-year 
program received federal student loans, borrowing an average of $9,660.115 
By comparison, 46.8 percent of students at public universities in a four-year 
program borrowed an average of $5,972.116 These figures stem from the 
higher costs of tuition at for-profit institutions for students who generally 
come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.117 
In addition to borrowing at higher rates compared to students at 
traditional universities, for-profit university students receive a 
disproportionate share of all federal student assistance.118 Students at for-
profit institutions often must take out loans to cover these institutions’ 
higher tuition rates.119 The lower socioeconomic status of students at for-
profit universities exacerbates this need to borrow.120 Though students at 
for-profit universities only accounted for 10.6 percent of all students in 
postsecondary education during 2009,121 these students receive 
approximately 24 percent of Pell Grants, 25 percent of subsidized Stafford 
loans, 28 percent of unsubsidized Stafford loans, and 12 percent of PLUS 
loans of the pools of available funds.122 Combined, these forms of 
assistance amount to $26.5 billionmore than a quarter of all distributed 
federal aid.123 The student populations at for-profit universities amount only 
to a sliver of the higher education population,124 yet these students receive a 
significant and disproportionate amount of all available federal student 
aid.125 
C. THE DEFAULT PROBLEM: INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE AND 
GRADING THE BUSINESS OF EDUCATION 
The logical conclusion to student borrowing trends is that students 
attending for-profit universities exit school with more debt than do students 
at public and private non-profit universities. The impetus behind the 
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Department’s attempt to impose stricter regulations on institutions receiving 
Title IV funding is not necessarily that these students must take on more 
debt, it is that the debt incurred is so encumbering, while these students 
have minimal chances of repaying their debts due to poor employment 
prospects or opportunities for increased income.126 The Department sought 
to hold institutions accountable to both their costs and their claims that 
induced enrollment.127 The inability to repay loans often occurs because the 
massive debt taken on to attend a for-profit university is not realized from 
earnings potential as students often graduate with minimal employment 
opportunities in already oversaturated occupations.128 As the federal 
government guarantees Title IV funding,129 when students cannot repay 
loan debt, the federal government pays a lending agency the remaining 
balance.130 This system results in taxpayers simultaneously paying 
someone’s debt and another’s dividend because an institution’s high tuition 
costs for a program leading to inadequate opportunities to repay the loans 
leads to a default. 
This high tuition, low opportunity system created concern that unpaid 
student loans may become the next market bubble.131 Unfortunately for 
these students, they often do not have the means to later repay their loans 
and must default.132 When federal student loans are in default, the schools 
have already received their tuition payments, while the remaining balance 
of the loan is footed by taxpayer dollars.133 In addition to disproportionate 
rates of borrowing,134 students attending for-profit institutions account for 
only 12 percent of the higher education population, yet they account for 46 
percent of student loan defaults.135 One bankruptcy judge, after hearing a 
case of a student recruited by misrepresentations of future employment 
value, defined the situation as “the farmer (U.S. government) putting the 
fox ([a trade school]) in charge of the hen house (students) and not only 
blaming the students if they get eaten, but also charging them for the cost of 
the meal.”136 Moreover, when a student loan is in default, the borrowing 
student is precluded from receiving other federal student assistance while 
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the loan is in default,137 potentially foreclosing the opportunity of higher 
education for the student.138 The high rate of default among for-profit 
university students after taking out large amounts in aid that is then given to 
institutions who post enormous revenues through taxpayer money prompted 
the DOE to promulgate tighter regulations focused on holding the industry 
accountable for its claims of “gainful employment.”139 
D. CURRENT REGULATION AND UNIVERSITY MANIPULATION 
Currently, a for-profit university’s Title IV eligibility is contingent 
upon it meeting a “cohort default rate.”140 A cohort default rate is the 
calculation based on the rate of default of students on their federal loans 
over the two-year period after loans begin repayment.141 An institution loses 
its Title IV eligibility when its cohort default rate exceeds 25 percent for 
three consecutive years, or exceeds 40 percent in the most recent fiscal 
year.142 The GAO found that the average cohort default rate for for-profit 
institutions in 2004 was 8.6 percent, compared to 4.7 percent and 3 percent 
of public and private nonprofit institutions, respectively.143 However, the 
DOE believed that the cohort default rate is inadequate to assess 
institutional performance and must be supplemented.144 
1. Cohort Manipulation 
Though the for-profit industry average cohort default rate is below the 
statutory threshold, institutions use dilatory tactics to manipulate their 
default rate to fall under the statutory threshold. Payment of loans by a 
school on behalf of a borrower is forbidden under Title IV, and such 
conduct would result as an event of default on that student’s loan for the 
purpose of calculating an institution’s cohort default rate.145 A 2008 
investigation of Technical Career Institute (TCI), a for-profit institution 
with approximately 3,000 students, revealed that the college paid over 
$440,000 to federal lenders on behalf of students who withdrew during their 
first semester, in order to prevent an increase in its cohort default rate.146 A 
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benevolent act at first glance by TCI for students who chose not to continue 
their education, this action was in no respect a refund. TCI’s actions 
stopped a rise in the school’s cohort default rate, and TCI later attempted to 
collect the amounts from its students through repayment plans.147 When the 
students did not pay, TCI would send the accounts to collection agencies.148 
A similar complaint was brought against the University of Phoenix.149 Such 
lawsuits strengthen the case for allegations that some institutions carry out 
ethically questionable and illegal conduct in order to satisfy statutory 
thresholds.150 
2. The 90/10 Rule 
In addition to the cohort default rate, for-profit universities are subject 
to the “90/10” rule.151 Amendments to the HEA in 1998 mandated that for-
profit institutions must derive no more than 90 percent of its revenue from 
non-Title IV aid in two consecutive years to remain Title IV eligible.152 As 
noted, for-profit universities receive nearly 90 percent of their revenue from 
tuition.153 Some commentators suggest that for-profit universities skew their 
revenue sources to keep the relevant figures below the statutory limit, as 
losing a source that contributes nearly 90 percent of revenue would likely 
shut down many of these institutions.154 Some of the larger for-profit 
institutions expressed concern that they may be in violation of the 90/10 
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rule,155 while others blame the “restrictiveness” of the 90/10 rule as 
necessitating tuition increases in order to maintain compliance.156 
IV. PROGRAM INTEGRITY 
Through Program Integrity, the Department wanted to compel for-profit 
institutions to substantiate their claims of providing gainful post-graduate 
employment.157 The Department believes that Title IV assistance to students 
at for-profit universities provides the potential for a worthwhile education 
for nontraditional students.158 However, the Department was concerned that 
the amount of debt that most students incur to pay for the higher tuition 
costs at for-profit universities provides no return through gainful 
employment.159 To allay this concern, the Department wanted to shift the 
focus from institutional-level performance via the cohort default rate, to 
post-graduation performance of the student aggregation.160 The DOE states: 
The Department’s experience with the [cohort default rate] is that . . . it 
does not identify the harm to students that can come from enrolling in a 
specific program that leaves them with high education debts and limited 
job opportunities. An institution’s average default rate does not measure 
the effect of any individual program, and that information alone does not 
provide a student with a measure of whether he or she will be able to 
achieve a career goal and pay off loan debt.161 
Under Program Integrity, if an institution achieves “a repayment rate of 
at least 35 percent or its annual loan payment under the debt-to-earnings 
ratios is 12 percent or less of annual earnings or 30 percent or less of 
discretionary income,” that institution would be offering programs that lead 
to gainful employment.162 Only after an institution failed to meet these three 
debt measures for three out of four fiscal years would that institution have 
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lost its Title IV eligibility.163 Should the institution have failed to meet one 
of the measures, new students could not qualify for Title IV funds, since the 
program would not have been one leading to gainful employment.164 The 
Department permitted institutions three years to come into compliance with 
Program Integrity by delaying calculations based on these  metrics until FY 
2014.165 No institution would have lost Title IV eligibility through the 
Program Integrity metrics until FY 2015.166 While these metrics defined 
institutional performance through student outcomes, Program Integrity 
would have had little impact on student debt burdens. 
A. REPAYMENT RATE 
Program Integrity sought to measure a program’s performance by its 
collective student repayment rate.167 The DOE believed this metric was 
needed as the cohort default rate measures the effective use of taxpayer 
dollars, but does not address the burdens on borrowers.168 Secretary of 
Education Arne Duncan stated, “[W]e’re asking companies that get up to 90 
percent of their profits from taxpayer dollars to be at least 35 percent 
effective.”169 Counterintuitive in this metric though was that an institution 
would still be leading to gainful employment even if 65 percent of its 
students were not repaying their loans. When examining the consequences 
of unaffordable debt, the DOE stated how “46 percent of student loans . . . 
borrowed by students at two-year for-profit institutions are expected to go 
into default over the life of the loans.”170 Under the cohort default rate, this 
46 percent of default expectancy would not result in Title IV ineligibility or 
restriction, as the rate only calculates defaults of loans within the first two 
years of repayment.171 The Program Integrity repayment rate wanted to 
address this gap between the statutory calculation and the post-graduation 
period with a substantial number of defaults by calculating the rate of loan 
repayment after two years after a loan enters repayment.172 One 
improvement through this change would be that a loan is not considered in 
default for the purposes of calculating a cohort default rate if the default had 
existed for 270 days if the loan were to be repaid on a monthly schedule.173 
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Effectively, a default could occur within the first two years of repayment, 
but not be calculated in the cohort default rate until the following year or 
never included at all. The new metric would have eliminated this potential 
delay by focusing on repayment in the third and fourth years of a loan’s 
repayment period.174 The new calculation of the repayment rate would have 
provided the DOE more accurate data for loans in default during the typical 
course of repayment that would not be encompassed in the current cohort 
default rate.175 
Program Integrity tightened regulatory enforcement through expanding 
the frequency of repayment failure. The cohort default rate does not result 
in Title IV ineligibility unless an institution’s default rate exceeds 25 
percent for three consecutive years.176 Had Program Integrity become 
effective, a school would also have been subject to Title IV ineligibility if 
its repayment rate fell below 35 percent for “three out of four [fiscal 
years].”177 Under that rule, a school could not cleanse itself from potential 
ineligibility for another three years by simply improving its repayment rate 
for one year after two years of inadequacy. Furthermore, it would have 
decreased the incentive through potential manipulation of an institutions 
cohort default rate.178 As actors of business acumen in “maximizing 
efficiency,”179 for-profit institutions would be encouraged to create or 
improve programs that provide consistent results, or eliminate inefficient or 
failing programs.  
The repayment rate metric the DOE wanted to adopt would have 
defined borrowers to be in repayment when they are successfully repaying 
their loans.180 Such a definition of “repayment” is tautologous, but a 
borrower would be in repayment when it reduced the balance of its 
principal by at least one dollar.181 A borrower making payments only on 
accrued interest thus would not have been considered in repayment of a 
loan, and if a borrower failed to pay off at least a dollar of the balance, the 
loan would be in default for calculation of the repayment rate metric.182 One 
exception exists for borrowers under income-sensitive repayment plans.183 
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These borrowers, so long as they meet their obligations under the 
repayment plans, would be considered in repayment even if their 
repayments only cover accrued interest, so long as “the program at issue 
does not have unusually large numbers of students in those categories.”184 
B. INCOME-BASED METRICS 
Program Integrity also required two income-based metrics to ensure 
that a borrower repaying the loan and repayment were feasible and still 
within living standards. For-profit institutions would have been required to 
demonstrate that the aggregation of borrowing students maintain an annual 
debt-to-earnings ratio below 12 percent of yearly earnings and less than 30 
percent of discretionary income.185 Measuring student debt with annual 
earnings would allow DOE to determine whether a program’s cost relates to 
the possibility for future earnings. Furthermore, in providing for no more 
than 30 percent of earned discretionary income186 going toward debt 
payments, a borrower would not have to enter a vicious cycle of working 
only for the purpose of paying off debt that was incurred to only later work 
it off. 
As noted above, an institution would have been deemed ineligible for 
Title IV aid if it failed to meet all three metrics in Program Integrity for 
three out of four fiscal years.187 However, if an institution failed to meet 
either the repayment rate or one of the debt-to-earnings ratios for one fiscal 
year, the institution would have been warned by the DOE and would then 
have to provide enrolled and prospective students notice of its failure to 
comply with the regulation and explain the possible consequences— the 
potential loss of Title IV eligibility.188 Furthermore, the institution would 
have had to explain the debt measures and describe any actions planned to 
improve performance under the debt measures.189 This notice would have 
required an institution to be directly accountable to its students and 
prospective students for its failure to meet its own representations regarding 
gainful employment. 
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C. LOBBYING: FILING DOWN THE TEETH OF REGULATORY BITE 
In addition to expending large amount of revenue on marketing,190 the 
for-profit higher education industry maintains a strong lobbying base in 
Washington, D.C. Extensive lobbying efforts by the for-profit education 
industry diluted the earliest proposals of the Program Integrity regulations. 
The earliest provisions of Program Integrity would have permitted 
governmental action should an institution’s borrowing students fail to reach 
a repayment rate of 45 percent, a 40 percent of discretionary income, and an 
8 percent debt-to-earnings ratio.191 This lobbying effort claimed institutions 
would not be able to meet the new regulations, in effect claiming that less 
than half of their students would not be able to repay their debt.192 To 
combat the perceived “restrictiveness” of the early draft of Program 
Integrity, the for-profit education industry more than doubled its lobbying 
expenses in 2010 to nearly $4 million.193 The potential for Program 
Integrity to reduce student loan debt is exhibited by the lobbying efforts 
against Program Integrity by the for-profit education that ultimately 
“watered down” the final product.194 Ultimately, it was an industry lobbying 
group challenging the rulemaking that sounded Program Integrity’s death 
knell. 
D. PROGRAM INTEGRITY: A TOOTHLESS SMILE 
The impact of Program Integrity on student loan debt would have been 
negligible. The DOE enacted Program Integrity with a market-based 
perspective—that students would make informed decisions to enroll in an 
institution by measuring a program’s value relative to its costs and the 
potential for gainful employment—and, ultimately, institutions would have 
been encouraged to improve performance therewith.195 Through Program 
Integrity, disclosures to students would have given them information to 
know if a program offers gainful employment, and the worst performing 
programs could be easily identified from its students’ failure to repay 
loans.196 Though the Department wanted to ensure that programs are at least 
35 percent effective, under the final regulation only 4 percent of four-year 
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for profit institutions would have failed to meet the repayment requirement, 
and 6.2 percent would have fallen below the threshold for two-year 
institutions.197 Moreover, only 3 percent of institutions would have failed a 
metric once, and only 1 percent of schools would have lost eligibility, 
corresponding to only 7 percent of the student population in a program that 
failed one metric, and only 1 percent of students would have been affected 
by a program’s lost eligibility.198 If these numbers were correct, then 97 
percent of institutions were providing programs that lead to gainful 
employment.  Effectively, the DOE said through its Program Integrity 
rulemaking that it had concerns about programs leaving students with no 
future employment prospects, but also saying such concerns only extend to, 
at most, 3 percent of the regulated institutions—that its then current 
regulatory approach was inadequate for a problem affecting a mere 3 
percent of the industry. Rather, the calculated results of Program Integrity 
demonstrate how ineffectual the regulations would have been. These 
insignificant figures contradict the DOE’s acknowledgement of the high 
default rate of for-profit university students. Program Integrity would have 
revealed the industry’s worst performers, but severing Title IV eligibility 
would have only removed the most culpable cheaters from a rigged 
gamethe worst offenders are removed, but the play remains unfair. 
Without fear of lost federal aid, schools would have had no incentive to 
reduce tuition, limit selectivity, or reduce marketing practices that tempt 
people into ineffective programs.199 With these factors remaining, students 
would need to continue borrowing high amounts for programs that at best 
needed to only be 35 percent effective. 
V. “HORSE OF A DIFFERENT COLOR” 
A. THE FAULTY ASSUMPTION BEHIND PROGRAM INTEGRITY 
In measuring institutional performance by post-graduate gainful 
employment rates, the DOE views education from a for-profit university as 
more of a marketable commodity than intellectual pursuit in itself; if such 
programs exist solely for employability purposes then they should be 
regulated as such. Program Integrity’s focus on the value of education 
offered was guided mainly by post-graduation employment performance. 
Obvious, yet nascent, in Program Integrity is an assumption that the for-
profit education industry is similar to the industry that existed when HEA 
opened Title IV access to the for-profit sector. While many amendments to 
the HEA changed the rules for eligibility for Title IV access, Program 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Id. at 34,396 tbl.A.  
 198. Id. at 34,459.  
 199. See Eisman, supra note 15, at 3. 
532 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 7 
Integrity glossed over the troubling aspect of this sector of the education 
industrythe conflict between providing valuable education and the 
incentive for large profits and pressure to meet shareholder demand. 
 
“The purpose of any organization under the law is earnings—profit.”200 
 
A fundamental principle underlying the corporate identity is that the 
primary purpose of corporate existence is the maximization of shareholder 
profit.201 This plain definition holds that the corporation must act on behalf 
of shareholder interest when making business decisions.202 When the HEA 
first opened Title IV eligibility to for-profit institutions, the industry 
consisted primarily of independent “mom-and-pop” schools offering 
training in vocational fields such as cosmetology and truck driving.203 
Today, for-profit universities are large, highly sophisticated multi-state 
institutions that offer even advanced doctoral-level degrees.204 The hand of 
government aid is feeding the mouth of a different beast than the puppy it 
let indoors in 1972, but the Department’s regulatory approach fails to 
address this institutional evolution. Though institutions in 1972 were still 
driven by profit, current for-profit universities owe obligations to 
stockholders and parent companies. The focus of Program Integrity on for-
profit universities as institutions of education neglected the primary purpose 
of the for-profit education industryprofit. 
A fair understanding of profit motive would be that providing a 
valuable commodity serves the benefit of profit. However, given the high 
percentage of revenues earned by federal aid, the for-profit education 
industry is able to provide an ineffective product for more than half of its 
consumers and remain highly profitable.205 With the constant supply of 
Title IV dollars, the industry is under no incentive to improve institutional 
performance beyond federal requirements. The for-profit education industry 
is successful in luring people through the door, but Program Integrity 
sought to regulate educational value through an implied out-the-door 
warranty policy. Program Integrity only provided a floor for which the 
industry must perform, an outcome-determinative approach that measures 
the outcomes of a system rather than the rules under which that system 
operates. Effective regulation of the for-profit education industry will best 
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serve the interests of the students’ education and their ability to repay 
subsequent debt obligations by aligning the industry’s profit interests with 
student success. The DOE recognizes the dependence on revenues to 
enrollment,206 yet its regulatory approach failed to correct the methods by 
which students are enrolled. Instead, the Department attempted to focus on 
after-the-fact data wherein students would have still suffered debilitating 
debt. 
B. CONSIDER THE PROFIT 
1. The Benefit to For-Profit Universities of Students Holding 
the Risk 
Given the operation of for-profit universities, students borrow what are, 
in effect, junk bonds. The potential for a return on the debt instrument is 
very speculative, with the high risk of default being allocated entirely on the 
holderthe student. Universities receive payment from the students 
through tuition and fees via a debt instrument, but apart from a lenient 
legislative structure, universities have no obligations on that debt and 
payment is guaranteed. The product of education is unique where the 
potential for risk is entirely absolved, federal loans are guaranteed by the 
federal government, and the debts are generally non-dischargeable in 
bankruptcy.207 Once an enrolled student pays tuition, the for-profit 
university achieves its profit goal. Retaining students would enable further 
profit growth; however, even with a withdrawal rate over 50 percent, the 
industry is highly profitable.208 With increasing enrollments, it is to the 
university’s benefit to reduce educational value by cutting costs, so long as 
students keep filing through the doors and filling their financial aid forms. 
So long as enrollments increase, universities have no incentive to improve 
institutional performance. Rather, further investment into educational value 
would be to the detriment of profit margins. 
2. Requiring a Marketing-to-Institutional Expenses Ratio 
In focusing on the industry’s profit motive, one alternative remedy 
would be to require Title IV recipients to maintain a ratio on revenue 
expenditures based on the institution’s marketing and institutional expenses. 
The current problem underpinning the industry is that the profit motive is 
driven solely on recruitment for enrollment and that the education itself is 
ignored. By imposing a metric that determines the amount a university may 
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spend on marketing, schools will improve the educational value rendered, 
increasing the likelihood that a student’s investment will be returned. This 
would not necessarily require schools to cut marketing expenses or force it 
to spend more money. If a school wishes to promote itself more, it would 
then be required to allocate more funds into new faculty, new technologies 
or infrastructure, or student resources to correspond with increased 
marketing expenses. Moreover, marketing expenses could be displaced into 
education expenses, without the school needing to increase or cut expenses. 
3. Easing the Restrictions on Dischargeability of Student Loans 
in Bankruptcy 
One remedy to ease student debt burdens would be to ease the 
restrictive “undue hardship” exception in the bankruptcy code. Generally, 
student loans are non-dischargeable unless a debtor shows he or she cannot 
maintain a minimal standard of living if forced to repay loans and that the 
the debtor has made a good faith effort to repay the loan and additional 
circumstances exist indicating the state of affairs is likely to persist for the 
repayment period of the loan.209 This is a difficult showing.210 Allowing 
students who graduated from a for-profit university and demonstrated a 
good faith effort to obtain employment in the specified occupation of the 
program would be aligned with the policy underlying the required showing 
under undue hardship exception,211 while absolving the student from a 
burdensome debt that resulted in no return. 
CONCLUSION 
The for-profit education industry quickly grew into a titan in higher 
education. The industry’s focus on employability and career oriented 
programs offer an alternative to traditional forms of higher education for 
students seeking specific skills and training, while also allowing an inroad 
for non-traditional students to access higher education. However, the profit 
motive of the industry led to substandard student performance following 
graduation. The current legislative and regulatory approach to for-profit 
higher education does not adequately prevent abuse by the industry in 
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recruiting students, nor does it incentivize the industry to promote students’ 
post-graduation success. Program Integrity attempted to hold the industry 
accountable to its claims that it leads to gainful employment. However, if 
the Department continues to take a similar regulatory approach, it will fail 
to address the looming problem of collective student loan debt and default. 
Without regulation that encourages institutional performance to coincide 
with the industry’s profit motive, regulations like Program Integrity will not 
halt student debt burdens. Such regulations only sever the worst performers, 
while leaving the broken system intact. Rather, current regulatory 
enforcement encourages for-profit universities to maintain questionable 
business practices, as circumventing the law may be necessary to avoid the 
Title IV ineligibility death sentence. The investment of taxpayer dollars and 
the mortgaging of students’ financial future is too great a risk to leave in the 
hands of an industry that has competing and perhaps conflicting interests 
between its shareholders and students. 
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